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A Regional Innovation System in
Gestation: Guangdong
Rigas Arvanitis et Eglantine Jastrabsky
1 Guangdong province, and the Pearl River Delta in particular, are the areas that have
experienced  the  highest  rate  of  industrialisation  in  China  since  the  launch  of  the
reform policy in 1978. Up to the end of the 1990s, a considerable number of private
enterprises—but under a wide range of forms of ownership—were created through local
initiative.  The  region  thus  experienced  a  two-fold  process:  the  creation  of  small
enterprises specialising in often traditional industrial production, and the formation of
specialised  production  zones.  From  1999,  the  provincial  government  sought  to
stimulate the improvement of production techniques and of basic technologies in the
region.  This  public  initiative  coincided  with  a  private  dynamic  and  contributed  to
raising the level of industrial performance in the Delta. The question is whether the
region will manage to make the technological transformation which is essential to the
future competitiveness of its industry. The transformation of even a high-performance
industrial  area  into  a  system  of  innovation,  where  governments,  universities  and
enterprises interact in a permanent fashion in order to innovate and create a region on
the cutting edge of progress, remains a difficult objective to achieve. It seems that the
local  authorities,  rather  than  having  an  innovation  policy—which  is  to  say  taking
measures  which would make it  possible  to  structure  interactions—,  have sought  to
support enterprises or groups of enterprises on a one-off basis, through a succession of
experiments.
2 While  the  region  lacks  universities  of  renown  and  research  centres  of  national
standing, investments by enterprises in Research and Development (R&D) are higher
there than in the other Chinese provinces. This characteristic, which is close to the
situation experienced by Singapore in the early 1980s1, has been the starting point of
this research. After setting out the development of industrial and technology policy in
Guangdong at  the  end of  the  1990s,  we  will  concentrate  on a  study  of  the  role  of
enterprises in R&D and on an analysis of the effects that the policies of specialised
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industrial zones, aimed at developing applied research and innovation, can have on the
emergence of a system of innovation.
3 This article is based on a report drawn up by a team of researchers and professors
under the authority of the Office of Science and Technology of Guangdong province,
which we will henceforth refer to as the "Blue Report", after the colour of its cover2.
This is the only report available that brings together all the data at provincial level. Our
analysis of the report is guided by the specialised literature on the question, and by
interviews with local  authorities  and enterprises  carried out  by the team from the
Franco-Chinese Centre for the Sociology of Industry and Technology, in collaboration
with the Institute for Research and Development of Guangdong University (Sun Yat-sen
University in Guangzhou), between 2000 and 20043.
4 In  May 1998,  the  Communist  Party  (CP)  of  Guangdong province  took  a  decision to
promote scientific and technological progress, to modernise industrial facilities and "to
make enterprises the source of innovation". Shortly afterwards came the publication of
Report No. 16 entitled "On the decision to rely on scientific and technological progress
to attain a higher level of production in Guangdong"4. The same year, the Guangdong
provincial authorities committed themselves to the development of science teaching
and to setting up a system of innovation, "which is to say to favour the grouping of
enterprises,  to  attract  foreign  investment  and  multinationals  and  to  create  a
productive environment, particularly in the technology belt of the Pearl River Delta"5.
This definition of the system of innovation is closer to that of an efficient production
system—a group of enterprises which are in competition or linked by commercial ties
from  suppliers  to  customers—than  to  a  system  of  innovation,  which  is  a  set  of
interactions between the educational, scientific, technological and economic systems6.
In Guangdong there is a lack of both the scientific component and innovation proper,
which is to say the introduction of new products and processes in enterprises.
5 1999  marked  a  turning  point  in  China,  with  the  approval  of  a  national  policy  for
stimulating  the  industrial  and  technological  development  of  Chinese  enterprises.
Innovation  became the  buzzword.  The  novelty  lay  in  the  recognition  given  by  the
authorities  to  collective  technology  enterprises7 in  the  widest  sense,  designated  as
bearers of technological progress. For ideological reasons, the central authorities could
not promote private enterprises in the early days of reform, whence the emergence of
this  category  of  enterprises,  situated  between  the  enterprises  of  the  centralised
economy and those of the free market. They were able to develop in Beijing by the
1980s, and above all during the 1990s, with the creation in 1991 of the high technology
development  zone  of  Zhongguancun.  In  1999,  concrete  measures  to  promote  high
technology  were  decreed  in  order  to  solve  the  crucial  problem  of  lack  of  internal
resources,  including subsidies,  tax reductions for R&D spending,  tax exemptions on
revenue derived from the transfer or development of new technology, a preferential
Value Added Tax (VAT) rate of 6% for any software produced and developed in China, a
total  exemption  from VAT,  and subsidies  for  any  exports  of  high  technology.  This
evolution was particularly noticeable in Guangdong, since it was at that time that the
local  authorities  realised  that  the  development  model  fuelled  by  foreign  direct
investment  (FDI)  was  not  sufficient  to  improve  the  intrinsic  capabilities  of  local
enterprises.  Beginning in  1998,  Guangdong began to  reform its  system of  scientific
research, by integrating enterprises more closely and committing them to setting up
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R&D centres. In early 2000, the province decreed measures of technological support for
enterprises, with the policy of "industrial clusters".
6 Reform  of  the  national  research  system  began  in  the  mid-1980s8.  After  initial
restructuring, in particular of the relations between the technology centres of the large
enterprises and their state supervisors, the major policy of the central government was
to reduce the funds allocated to public research institutions. Research institutes and
centres had to find non-governmental financing9. The positive consequences have been
a better fit between research and the needs of the market, and a diversification of the
areas of research. Moreover, some Chinese enterprises have developed in-house R&D
units. However, this way of integrating enterprises into the system "from below", has
led, for research institutions, to an increase in small-scale, short-term projects, with
smaller budgets, and generally to a levelling-off of progress in research, since overall,
enterprises have  not  been  involved  in  defining  or  initiating  government  research
programmes. Moreover, the national policy which consists in eliminating or privatising
a very high number of research centres of national standing is also called into question
by some observers, who, like Cao Cong or Adam Segal, have noted rigid separations
between the world of the university and that of enterprise10. The task is enormous since
it is a matter of reforming the Academy of Sciences (reducing the number of centres
and of  personnel,  who have  been cut  by  more  than 20,000),  changing  1,618  public
research institutes into enterprises (a reform which is well under way, since among the
technological development centres which were dependent on provincial and municipal
governments,  some  70%  have  been  registered  as  enterprises).  Some  205  institutes
which depended on various ministries  (Agriculture,  Territory and Resources,  Water
Resources,  the  Bureau  of  Forests  and  the  Weather  Bureau)  have  also  been
transformed11.
7 Economic  analyses  of  Guangdong  province  usually  concentrate  on  the  creation  of
enterprises  and  on  foreign  investment.  These  were  indeed  the  real  engines  of
development which were superimposed—that is the right word—on the old socialist
production structure12.  Guangdong is at present the richest province in China, since it
receives over one-third of FDI in China, and its exports of high technology account for
35% of China’s total.
8 The relative paucity of state enterprises13, the lack of heavy processing industries (basic
chemicals and steel) and the relative political autonomy enjoyed by the province in
Deng Xiaoping's  time,  as  well  as  the proximity of  Hong Kong and Macau,  gave the
province a decisive advantage. However, as the Blue Report shows, these advantages
for the development of  light assembly industry became handicaps when it  came to
raising  technological  capacity14.  Neither  Hong  Kong  nor  foreign  enterprises  really
invested in high technology. The main problem is that FDI cannot substitute for the
development  of  internal  technological  capacity,  because  foreign  companies  only
transfer  high  value  added  activities  if  they  are  sure  to  find  raw  materials  and
equipment in large quantities.
9 "In Guangdong, total investment in R&D was 1.942 billion yuan and 2.870 billion yuan
in 1996  and 1997,  or  0.3% and 0.39% of  the  province's  GDP"15.  In  2000,  investment
exceeded 10 billion yuan (US$1.2 billion) amounting to 1.11% of GDP—a little less than
Beijing (over 15 billion yuan of  R&D spending) but more than Shanghai (7.4 billion
yuan) [figures from October 2001].  However, in percentage of GDP, Guangdong is in
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third place, behind Shanghai, an indication of the relatively low level of its research
investment.
 
1.Research and Development (R&D) Spending in 2001
10 Generally  speaking—and  this  is  surprising—the  report  states  that  the  financing  of
research institutions  is  declining.  Now,  during  the  1990s,  the  central  government's
spending on basic research, both applied and experimental, remained stable. In 2000,
national R&D spending was 89 billion yuan, an increase of 18% over the previous year,
reaching 1% of GDP. Only 7% of total spending was then allocated to basic research
(figures from the Ministry of Science and Technology, but only 5.2% according to the
Blue Report). Despite an improved sharing out of resources, the benefits of investments
were  uncertain16.  The  World  Bank  report17 explained  this  apparent  contradiction
between the increase—for over ten years—in the share of R&D in relation to GDP, and
the decline in resources of the research institutions, by the increase in costs and by the
lack of transparency in allocations. In reality, it does seem that the recent period has
seen  a  massive  reorientation  of  public  spending  towards  less  centralised  facilities,
which are  more dependent  on local  authorities  and carry out  much more finalised
work.  Their  reorientation  was  accompanied  by  the  dismantling  of  central  research
centres that were supposed to be carrying out finalised research. The finding of the
authorities in 2002 was that "a number of questions have not yet been resolved, such as
that of the modernisation of equipment"18. In China, the central government remains
the principal  source of  financing for R&D, but,  as the Blue Report points out,  "this
funding is too low to allow research facilities to engage in sizeable long-term projects:
facilities coexist without any selection and lack their own initiative"19.
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2. Scientists and Engineers as a Proportion of the Population in 2000
11 Guangdong  enjoys  the  benefit  of  a  fairly  well-trained  technical  work  force:  of  the
province's total population, 238 out of every 10,000 have a qualification in a technical
specialisation and 1,886 employees out of every 10,000 have a technical specialisation.
In terms of this indicator, Guangdong is in second place at the national level20. But the
province has a major weakness in terms of high-level cadre training and lacks scientists
and engineers. The average level of education is below the national average, whether in
terms of young people attending university or in terms of the quality of the teachers.
What the Blue Report hints at, and which is also confirmed orally by various leaders, is
that the high average technical level of the province is due to the immigration of young
graduates  from other  Chinese provinces,  attracted by the employment possibilities.
Training is a paramount objective for the next few years. For example the universities
have set up adult training systems on Saturdays and Sundays, mainly in management
(in  the  form  of  MBAs  or  EMBAs).  This  market  has  become  extremely  competitive,
particularly in Shenzhen. In this city are to be found training programmes from several
universities, from Guangzhou and other cities (particularly Beijing). Companies pay for
these training programmes, which are often very expensive, for their cadres for at least
three reasons: they acquire a vocabulary and management models which correspond to
international models, they can build networks of personal relations with cadres from
other  enterprises,  and finally  these  courses  are  a  token of prestige  for  enterprises
which then advertise the high level of training of their cadres—an important criterion
of the enterprise's reputation in the eyes of the authorities, competitors, customers
and suppliers.
12 In  China  enterprises  invest  little  in  R&D:  the  share  of  their  investment  has  even
declined. Large and medium enterprises invested 1.39% of their income in R&D in 1991,
1.15% in  1995,  1.35% in  1999,  and 1.6% in  2001.  Guangdong,  according  to  the  Blue
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Report, shows better results in terms of enterprise investment than the other Chinese
provinces21.  Enterprise  investment  amounted  to  88%  of  overall  investment  in  2000
(9.520 million yuan) and 90% in 2001 (11.370 million yuan).
 
3. Resources and Spending in Science and Technology of the Principal Municipalities of
Guangdong
13 At  the  beginning  of  2001,  there  were  2,733  "technological  and  scientific  research
facilities", employing 95,400 scientists and technicians, about double the figure in 1995.
It is the city of Shenzhen which has carried this development the most: in 2001, it had
521 R&D facilities, of which 91.7% were set up by enterprises. In 2001, 26 development
centres of the most productive enterprises had developed 459 new products, and 440
patent registrations, of which 161 were for inventions. Their investment in research
had reached the sum of 4.220 billion yuan, or 6.62% of their total revenue (over 10% for
Huawei and Zhongxing (ZTE), leading electronics enterprises)22. In 2001, 65,000 patents
were issued in China, and Guangdong accounted for over half of these registrations.
Obviously this reflects the technological dynamism of the province, but also the scale of
foreign investment in the province, for most invention patents in China are taken out
by foreign enterprises, while Chinese enterprises tend to register utility models and
design23.
 
4. Patents Registered in Guangdong
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14 In  the  Special  Economic  Zone  of  Shenzhen,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Zhuhai,  the
authorities carried out an offensive to develop the technological capacity of enterprises
during the 1990s, but such was not the case in Guangzhou. In Shenzhen, the growth of
R&D facilities in enterprises was carried out on the basis of investment in electronics
(both national enterprises and those with foreign investment) above all, and by basing
itself  on  the  collective  technology  enterprises'  capacity  for  development.  However,
according  to  Adam  Segal,  Shenzhen  constituted  a  case  apart  in  the  region.  The
authorities in Guangzhou, in his view, and those in Guangdong province, according to
our own observations, were slow to promulgate policies to support high technology
enterprises. Guangzhou thus faced strong competition from Shenzhen, which managed
to tap into the flow of qualified personnel.
 
5. Research Organisations in Guangdong
15 In Guangdong, most R&D centres are set up within enterprises, which provide 70% of
the funding and are responsible for 65% of so-called high technology products. In 1998,
23.8%  of  major  enterprises  (including  national  enterprises,  the  big  groups  and
enterprises with foreign capital) had their own R&D centres, in 1999 26.2%, and in 2000
25.7%. In 2001, 85% of small and medium collective technology enterprises operating in
the technical sector had an R&D centre: of the 25.600 billion yuan invested in science
and technology in Guangdong, 71.4% came from the province's enterprises. Large and
medium enterprises invested 9.450 billion yuan that year, or 4.172 billion yuan more
than in 1997.  This movement of creation of R&D centres was not due to a political
initiative from the authorities, but rather to the transfer by certain foreign companies
of part of their R&D activity to China, and to particular support for certain enterprises
by their Chinese supervisory authorities. When the Guangdong authorities recognise
the importance of enterprises in the development of a system of innovation, they do
not play a decisive stimulation role, but ratify a largely spontaneous evolution. Thus,
when the  deputy  mayor  of  the  city  of  Jiangmen confides  during an interview that
science and technology are an essential aspect of economic development, this does not
translate  into  specific  measures  for  enterprises,  but  into  greater  tolerance  for
motorcycle  and  washing  machine  manufacturers,  who  are  more  advanced
technologically compared to the other industries in the municipality.
16 The term "collective technology enterprise" designates enterprises whose ownership is
public, even though most of them function de facto like private enterprises. The Blue
Report defines them by their orientation to the market and their responsibility for
profits  and losses24.  These enterprises have been the institutional  form of the most
dynamic enterprises all over the country. The major Chinese brands which are well
known abroad, such as TCL, Hai'er and Legend (now LeNovo), are collective technology
enterprises  which  have  been  privatised  to  varying  degrees.  The  major  brands  in
A Regional Innovation System in Gestation: Guangdong
China Perspectives, 63 | january - february 2006
7
Guangdong, such as Meidi (Midéa), Galanz, GREE and Kelon, are in a similar situation.
Enterprises such as Jinlin (domestic appliances) and Jinyue (electronic components),
are "privatised" public enterprises, which maintain close contact with their supervising
official bureau. The next few years should see a gradual modification of the legal status
of these enterprises.
17 At  the  end  of  the  1990s,  the  recession  in  Asia,  and  in  the  public  enterprises,  the
progress  of  the  negotiations  for  China's  accession to  the World Trade Organisation
(WTO),  combined  with  doubts  about  the  effects  of  previous  policies,  led  to  major
changes  in  relations  between  the  state  and  collective  enterprises.  The  Chinese
authorities  became  increasingly  preoccupied  with  not  missing  the  next  wave  of
technological  innovation,  particularly  in  Guangdong,  where  enterprises  were  better
known for  their  copies  of  major  brands  than for  the  creation  of  new products.  In
Guangzhou,  the  authorities  allowed  these  kinds  of  enterprises  to  register  in  the
category  of  private  enterprises  (siying  qiye,  WWWW),  without  defining  them  as
separate entities, with specific organisation and technological and financial needs.
18 In 2001, there were 3,952 collective enterprises (0.99% of enterprises in Guangdong),
with a  turnover of  over  103 billion yuan,  over  8  billion yuan in profits,  employing
314,000 people, paying over 7 billion yuan in taxes, and providing exports worth over
US$2 billion. These enterprises accounted for only 7.25% of production value and only
2% of total exports. In the two cities where they were most numerous, Shenzhen and
Guangzhou, they produced respectively only 10% and 11% of the value of industrial
production. They were generally small, employed an average of seventy people and had
a production value which did not exceed one million yuan per year. The enterprises
which  most  developed  technological  innovation  products  were  those  said  to  have
"three  sources  of  capital"  (public,  private  and  international)  which  we  usually  call
"joint companies"25.
 
6. Collective Science and Technology Entreprises in Guangdong
19 Despite their low proportion among the total number of enterprises in Guangdong, the
collective enterprises accounted for a little less than 30% of the value of cutting-edge
industrial production, and 88% of their products were "high technology". Table 6 shows
an  estimate  made  by  the  province's  services  of  the  number  of high  technology
collective  enterprises.  The  number  of  these  collective  enterprises  increased
significantly  during 2001.  In Guangdong's  ten zones for  the special  development of
cutting-edge technology at national and provincial level, these enterprises represented
about 80% of those in operation. In Shenzhen, in 2001, they accounted for 22 billion
yuan of high technology production.
20 These were also the enterprises which invested the most in R&D. In 1997 their R&D
investments did not exceed 1.5 billion yuan. Between 1997 and 2001, these investments
grew by an average of 60% a year, reaching 5.892 billion yuan in 2000 and 7.150 billion
in 2001, over half the investments made in the province that year. In the last few years,
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(before 2001) these enterprises developed over 3,000 new products, of which 70% are
protected by intellectual property law. In 2001, they deposited 3,514 patents, of which
2,763 were registered.
21 Guangdong has been the leading province in electronic products since the early 1990s.
In 2000, production of electronic equipment and software reached 300 billion yuan.
Guangdong had 21 of the 100 leading Chinese enterprises in this sector, among which
were three of the ten leading national companies. The Pearl River Delta specialised in
the manufacture of these appliances26. The authority's aim was to develop this sector
further in order to allow the region to compete with Beijing and Shanghai27.
22 Take-off took place in 1991, with production worth over 18 billion yuan, an increase of
73% over the previous year. During the eighth Five Year Plan, annual growth in the
sector was about 38% (1991-1995). In 1995, the electronics factories in Shenzhen and
Huizhou accounted for 67% of the province's total production value (sales at Huaqiang,
Kangjia, Saige and TCL exceeded 3 billion yuan in 1995)28.
23 The province's "three industrial pillars", electronics/computers, electrical equipment
and petroleum derivatives,  went from 253.334 billion yuan in 1997 to 311 billion in
2001. In 1998, these three industrial sectors amounted to 37.6% of the province's total
industrial production, and to 45.4% in 2001. The share of electronics and computers
rose from 16.4% to 22.2% during that time.
24 In 1997, sales of Guangdong software brought in only 2.5 billion yuan; in 2001 it was 10
billion yuan for software and 26 billion yuan for systems, around one-third of overall
sales  for  the  whole  country.  In  2001,  over  2,000  enterprises  were  engaged  in
development and sales of software, mainly in Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and to
a lesser extent in Nanhai, Dongguan and Shunde. However the authors of the report
point out that China is lagging behind India in research and in the training of computer
experts. This is why the development of this sector has been one of the objectives of the
tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2006).
25 In this sector,  as in all  of  its  production,  Guangdong is  characterised by a stronger
orientation towards exports than the rest of the country. Exports of so-called "high
technology" products in this region increased by 30% between 1999 and 2001. The so-
called high technology sector  as  a  whole  accounted for  over  23% of  the province's
exports in 2001. 2002 showed a continuation and even an increase in the same trend29.
26 Although the definition of the high technology sector includes many enterprises which
are limited to assembling imported components30, or even produce obsolete equipment
(often  by  choice,  as  we  saw  in  our  interviews,  for  there  is  national  demand  for
inexpensive equipment), the fact remains that the province turns shows a quite good
performance  in  comparison with  other  countries  which export  electronics.  It  must
however be emphasised that this push in the electronics industry was first initiated by
foreign investment, mainly from enterprises in Taiwan and Hong Kong. As we shall see,
the  local  authorities  initially  sought  to  attract  an  increasing  number  of  foreign
enterprises to the technology development zones, and subsequently sought to build up
the  technology  capacity  of  Chinese  SMEs  by  creating  "industrial  clusters".  The
limitations of these policies are the lack of real future prospects, and support for the
reproduction, rather than the production, of new techniques.
27 March 1986 saw the launch of the national programme called "863", which sought to
develop cutting-edge scientific research, shortly after the creation, in June 1985, of the
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Shenzhen  industrial  park31.  In  1988,  the  central  authorities  published  the  "Torch"
programme,  which  sought  to  harness  the  growth  of  collective  enterprises  to  the
development  of  scientific  parks.  Following  this  national  programme,  in  1991  the
authorities  in  Guangdong  set  up  27  high  technology  development  zones,  of  which
Zhongshan, Tianhe in Guangzhou, and Shenzhen were the models32. In 1992 and 1993, it
was the turn of Foshan, Huizhou and Zuhai to become high technology development
zones.  In  1991,  the  central  authorities  accepted  the  proposal  of  the  Guangdong
government  to  create  the  Delta's  high-tech  development  belt,  which  aimed  at
competing with that of Jiangsu (Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou) and that of Shanghai.
 
7. The Industrial Cluster Policy
28 This voluntarist policy produced results:  the boom in production took place around
2000, with the total production of these special zones rising from 50 billion yuan in
1997 to 180 billion in 2001. Moreover, total production of high technology products
rose  from 111 billion yuan in  1997 to  354  billion yuan in  2001,  with 132 billion in
Shenzhen (46%), 61 billion in Guangzhou, 47 billion in Foshan, a little over 20 billion
each for Dongguan and Huizhou, and between 12 and 17 billion for Zhuhai, Jiangmen
and  Zhongshan.  Shenzhen  and  Guangzhou  were  designated  as  spearheads  in  the
development of cutting-edge technology by Guangdong province in 1998. In these two
cities  were  developed the  first  cutting-edge  industrial  zones  in  the  electronics  and
computer  sectors.  In  Shenzhen  the  total  value  of  production  in  the  special  high
technology production zones exceeded 63 billion yuan in 2001, 17 times the value in
1996. Over half of the production was protected by intellectual property law. 98% of
production there was in electronics and computers.
29 The city of Zuhai's innovation policy was to attract multinationals. In 2001, the total
value of the production of these special zones reached 10 billion yuan. In Zhongshan,
the  special  technology  zones  produced  26  billion  yuan,  or  a  quarter  of  the  city's
industrial production and 7 billion more than the previous year.
30 Between these major zones have developed small and medium industrial cities, which
tended to become localised industrial systems33—which we shall call, in the rest of this
article, clusters, the English word used in Chinese—in more traditional sectors, such as
construction, plumbing, furniture and leather. The policy of developing the technology
zones was very different in nature from that of the industrial clusters.
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31 The  term  specialised  cluster  (zhuanye  zhen)  is  an  administrative  name  which  the
authorities give a locality in order to avail  of  specific  support in the framework of
subsidies for technological development. This designation facilitates the establishment
of  centres  for  innovation  and  technology  development  in  sectors  such  as  steel,
furniture, textiles,  construction, etc.  It  is  no longer a question of merely defining a
specific  zone to function as a magnet for foreign investment,  but of  improving the
technical and technological capacities of local enterprises by the creation of this kind
of structure. In contrast with the local production systems in France or the industrial
districts in Italy, the specialised product clusters are an official designation which make
it possible for municipalities to obtain subsidies from the province.
32 In 2000, the Department of Science and Technology of Guangdong officially launched a
pilot  project  aimed  at  encouraging  the  development  of  scientific  and  technical
innovation at district level and therefore to support growth of their economy. At that
time, 78 districts were chosen; some were even designated as models of technological
innovation. In July 2002, the province drew up a list of 38 localised innovation and
technology centres in specialised localities (see Table 8 for a partial list of specialised
localities)34.  Among  the  objectives  of  the  innovation  centres,  research  activities,  in
liaison with the universities and public institutions, are among the most important.
However this denomination covers small technical bureaus as well as real technology
centres.  Thus  for  example  the  locality  of  Suikou,  in  the  municipality  of  Kaiping
(Jiangmen),  which  specialises  in  taps  (or  “faucets”  as  is  the  American  word)  and
plumbing, had no innovation centre, but the local government invested 1 million yuan
in the creation of an Internet B2B (business to business) service for the tap industry.
This unit,  which became an independent enterprise in 2002, is probably exactly the
kind of interface which the locality needed35. In fact, of the 415 industrial groupings to
be found in the Delta, a quarter can be considered as "industrial clusters"36. They are
destined to become the favoured sites for innovation. A research programme carried
out by the Institute for the Development of Guangdong at the University of Zhongshan
(Sun Yat-sen) made it its main field of research37.
33 In Nanhai, nine technical innovation centres were set up within traditional industries
such as ceramics, textiles, clothing, aluminium products and foodstuffs. Furthermore, a
large  number  of  enterprises  sought  to  create  in-house  R&D units.  In  Pingzhou,  we
visited  a  shoe  manufacturing  SME  which  employed  150  people;  in  a  corner  of  the
production workshop, a young man and a young woman were designing shoes in a big
drawing book, detailing entirely by hand the shapes of the shoes to be cut out: this was
the R&D unit.
34 In  reality,  most  enterprises  are  short  of  funds,  techniques  and qualified personnel.
According to the Blue Report, the owners are peasants who have prospered but have no
industrial experience. Our observations are more complex, since in many specialised
localities, the bosses are former workers in production brigade and people's commune
enterprises which have become locality or district enterprises. While their technical
knowledge is rudimentary, they nevertheless have real competencies in their sector
(for example in founding, mechanics, electrolysis or galvanising).
35 The  development  of  the  municipality  of  Nanhai  shows  some  particularities.  The
grouping together of its enterprises took place long before the policy of formation and
subsidy for clusters. In Nanhai it was decided to "give the manufacturing sector its own
path". Thus each zhen (W, locality, an administrative unit smaller than a municipality)
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became a unit of reference. The innovation centres structured them individually, in
order to ensure the promotion of computer and production techniques, and to spread
commercial  information.  The  metal  and  mechanical  industry  in  Jinsha  brought
together in Nanhai some 4,000 enterprises which amounted to a production worth 10
billion yuan, 10% of national industry and 40% of industry at provincial level38. Half the
production was exported to Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Today, Jinsha
has 1,000 enterprises whose production exceeds 1 billion yuan, of which 98% are family
SMEs. They have no innovation capacity and the quality of their production is low. An
innovation centre was set up in September 1999. At the same time collaboration was set
up with the local Huazhong university to create an R&D enterprise and other research
structures. A development centre for new products was established including a unit
specialising  in  the  design  of  steel  moulds  for  extruding  machines.  This  technology
made it possible to reduce the design time for new moulds from 30 to 7 days. Since its
establishment, this innovation centre has created over 100 new products.
36 8. List of Industrial Clusters in Guangdong Province
37 Xiqiao and its  cotton textiles industry is  the perfect example of  the success of  this
policy. The locality had 1,670 textile enterprises for the printing and spinning of all
kinds  of  fabrics,  for  both  furniture  and  clothing.  The  annual  sales  of  this  locality
amounted to 13 billion yuan. The sizes of the factories were so small and so varied, and
the technical level so low, that the enterprises could see no point in initiating R&D
activities. In May 1999, the government set up an innovation centre. Since then the
centre has created over 8,000 products (computer assisted textile designs). Every day
the  centre's  personnel  visit  the  enterprises.  This  is  how  Xiqiao  is  moving  from
imitation to innovation. The centre also has clients in the provinces of Zhejiang and
Hunan, as well as in Taiwan. The initial investment was 7 million yuan, and the centre
quickly became self-sufficient by the sale of its services. Moreover, it participated in a
major  effort  to  computerise  the  enterprises,  ensuring  the  development  and
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maintenance of the local computer network. More recently, in 2004, the government of
the province decided to set  up a technical  university specialising in textiles and to
ensure that the locality of Xiqiao became a centre for technology development at a
national level.
38 The  policy  of  industrial  clusters  and  the  network  of  innovation  centres  which  are
attached to them make up the backbone of innovation policy in China, complementing
the other major facets which are the technology development zones, the support given
to  certain  enterprises,  and  the  transformation  of  enterprises  into  public  research
centres39.  The  innovation  centres  have  very  strong  links  with  local  enterprises,
particularly since they are a means for the computerisation of the enterprises,  and
because of their knowledge of local production conditions. It is this adaptation to local
conditions  which  explains  the  differences  between  them.  Each  innovation  centre
adjusts  to  particular  industrial  structures  and  the  nature  of  the  production  sector
obviously  greatly  influences  their  functioning.  The  dynamic  industrial  clusters
encourage these centres to become providers of product models. In the less dynamic
clusters,  their  role  is  much more  difficult  to  define.  Information is  often a  central
preoccupation but no previous experience of technology watch makes it possible for
the centre employees to sell information, which in most cases is limited to Internet
pages, and at best, to B2B systems. In reality the training and management needs of
enterprises far exceed what these centres can provide. The weakness of links with the
universities and technical schools makes this connection work even rarer and more
difficult.  Eventually,  one  of  the  functions  of  these  centres  will  be  to  play  an
intermediary role between research organisations and enterprises, if they can manage
to provide their own financing40.
39 The  authorities  in  the  province  of  Guangdong  have  understood  the  importance  of
supporting enterprises  in  their  technological  aspects.  They have recently  created a
system of indicators in order to follow technological developments more closely. It has
also been decided no longer to leave the initiative to local authorities alone, as they
lack resources. Thus, in textiles, the decision to transform a local technical centre into
a real  technological  and industrial  development centre cannot  depend on the local
authority  of  the  locality  of  Xiqiao.  Finally,  the  provincial  government  has  begun
thinking about the optimisation of the technical centres, which, besides their technical
functions, must contribute to the spreading of information and to networking with the
universities.
40 Moreover, many industrial zones are seeing the establishment of owner's associations
either on a sectoral or on a geographical basis. Local authorities seek to promote them
in order to have an interlocutor. For the moment it is not possible to tell whether these
associations will have any impact on the modernisation of enterprises.
41 We have concentrated on the industrial aspect alone, which represents the essential
feature of the economic development of the province, and of the Pearl River Delta. This
region  has  experienced  what  Gilles  Guiheux  calls  the  creation  of  a  local  economic
space41, following other researchers, geographers42, and economists43, who have shown
the importance of the local rooting of industry in China, or more generally, in several
developing countries44.
42 But in order to succeed in transforming an industrial space into a regional innovation
space  it  is  necessary  to  transcend local  limits,  particularly  by  creating  stable  links
between suppliers and clients, by facilitating access to technology resources, setting up
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a  qualified  labour  market  and  forging  links  with  the  universities.  Guangdong  has
simultaneously to face threefold competition as well as structural difficulties.
43 The competition comes partly from foreign companies, which take little account of the
technical centres and the growth of SMEs, and invest more and more in R&D in China45.
Foreign  investors,  from  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong, Korea,  Japan  and  the  West,  who  are
numerous in Guangdong, make up a separate group of economic players who are very
little integrated into the local economy, and use the local space as if it were a mine, rich
in cheap labour, even when highly trained (a CAD technician hardly costs more than a
worker), and in infrastructure (the various incentives offered by local government to
foreign investors). The competition also comes from other Chinese industrial regions
seeking to access the resources of the central government. This competition is obvious
at both local and provincial level. Lastly must be emphasised the particular competition
of Beijing and Shanghai, cities which, because of their political status, monopolise high
level  scientific  resources  and  receive  preferential  support  to  establish  technology
development centres. Their position reflects political choices which are not necessarily
based on economic rationality,  as is  shown by the multitude of  urban development
plans which have benefited Shanghai, the pressures on multinationals to set up there,
or  the  measures  in  favour  of  establishing  companies  in  Beijing.  Oddly,  provincial
political leaders never mention a threat from Asia. Only India is mentioned in the field
of software development parks as an example to be followed and overtaken. Malaysia (a
strong centre of techno-industrial development), Thailand and Singapore do not even
rate a mention, either as competitors or as markets. And so it is that the enterprises
themselves seem to aim more easily at Europe, the United States and America, central
Asia and Africa, than at South or Southeast Asia.
44 The structural problems are related both to the legacy of the former socialist economy
and  to  recent  growth.  The  national  private  sector,  which  is  particularly  active  in
Guangdong,  is  beginning  to  claim  a  representative  position,  an  attitude  which  is
sometimes corporatist but very real, and which the state has to face for the first time in
its history. The considerable power of local governments is being called into question,
and negotiations to establish priorities in financing will not be easy. The lack of clear
distinction between public and private,  which was an advantage for the creation of
SMEs, becomes a difficulty when it comes to supporting the technological upgrading of
enterprises. Lastly the lack of confidence of enterprises vis-à-vis the collective (not to
say the public) where links of trust, which are essential for the creation of enterprises,
do not offer a configuration, constitute a further obstacle. For the moment enterprises
are  above  all  consumers  of  infrastructure  and  there  are  only  rare  cases  where
professional or industrial associations connect with local authorities.
45 Nobody can say today if enterprises and local authorities will succeed in setting up an
innovation  system,  but  two  aspects  point  in  that  direction.  The  provincial
government's thinking is particularly active and includes considerable observation on
the ground. Far from being a diktat, it is a carefully thought-out policy drawing on both
foreign experiments46 and on local reality.  The government report we have used in
these pages is evidence of this. This initiates a process of discussion, for example on the
very nature of  innovation activities,  the role  of  the universities,  the functioning of
innovation  centres,  and  the  role  of  national  and  foreign  enterprises.  Moreover,
enterprises inserted in industrial clusters inevitably maintain a symbiotic relationship
with innovation centres, which counterbalance their shortcomings in technology and
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their strong links with foreign customers. The bringing together of political will, local
resources, a dense industrial network and the fast learning of technology indicates a
favourable outcome.
46 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
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in Nanzhuang (Nanhai), aluminium in Dali (Nanhai), metal parts in Jinsha, textiles in
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10. We would be much more cautious about the supposed impermeability between the
worlds of the university and of enterprise. Our interviews drew attention rather to
institutional difficulties, in the sense that enterprises find it difficult to sign a contract
with universities. But we have been able to observe a considerable number of personal
agreements between academics in the fields of the applied sciences, and enterprises.
This permeability sometimes goes beyond reason, for some professors neglect their
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11. These figures cannot be verified. They come from a range of official reports, and
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movement to privatise public institutions has indeed taken place. See for example Yuli
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434. See especially the article by Cong Cao, “Challenges for Technological Development
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as well as for their own profits and losses. (Blue Report, op. cit., p. 129).
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46. The Guangdong government has repeatedly asked for reports on local production
systems in Italy and France. Provincial officials carried out missions to France, Italy and
India in 2000-2004. The government has also commissioned much research from Sun
Yat-sen University, among others, in order to help its thinking. The conference on
regional innovation systems in China and the world at Sun Yat-sen University,
Guangzhou, in April 2004 was organised for the same reasons. The Blue Report is also
based on academic research and is not the result of administrative reports. This desire
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RÉSUMÉS
This article examines industrial and technological growth in the province of Guangdong and the
Pearl River Delta. It is based on a report drawn up by a team of researchers and professors under
the authority  of  the  Department  of  Science and Technology of  Guangdong province,  and on
interviews  with  local  authorities  and  enterprises.  It  examines  the  growth  in  Guangdong's
research and technology system, enterprise investment in Research and Development (R&D), the
particular role of collective enterprises, the technological development zones, and the policy of
industrial  "clusters".  Since  1999,  the  provincial  authorities  have  sought  to  respond  to  the
transformation of industrial space, by offering to set up a series of innovation centres located in
specialised  production  areas.  This  article  offers  an  initial  assessment  of  this  strategy  of
transforming industrial space into regional innovation space. 
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